Judicial Discretion as an Element of the Administration of Criminal Justice (Theoretical Outline)
Czasopismo Prawa Karnego i Nauk Penalnych Rok XXV: 2021, numer 4
Journal of Criminal Law and Penal Studies Volume XXV: 2021, No. 4
Witold Zontek – dr, Katedra Prawa Karnego, Uniwersytet Jagielloński / Ph.D., Department of Criminal Law, Jagiellonian University; ORCID: 0000-0002-7850-3930; e-mail: witold.zontek@uj.edu.pl.
Full text in PDF (open access)
Keywords
judicial discretion, administration of justice, court, criminal law, separation of powers
Summary
The concept of discretion in the domestic literature is generally associated closely with
the theory or philosophy of law. This issue, despite the fact that its modern theoretical
framework was created precisely by legal theorists headed by H.L.A. Hart and R. Dwor-
kin, has a much deeper significance for the current debate on the modern democratic
state and the role of the judiciary, especially in criminal cases. The text shows theoretical
approaches to the phenomenon of discretion. The requirement of judicial independence,
which is an integral element of the judiciary, falls within the essence of the right to ef-
fective judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair trial. The criminal court in
this view has a special role, as it decides on the most far-reaching restrictions on rights
and freedoms. When shaping the rules of criminal liability, the legislator must bear in
mind that it is not its role to decide individual cases, a competence constitutionally
reserved for the courts.
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